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author | Gregory Nutt <gnutt@nuttx.org> | 2014-09-13 06:10:23 -0600 |
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committer | Gregory Nutt <gnutt@nuttx.org> | 2014-09-13 06:10:23 -0600 |
commit | a1b0818673cff7d293ab28bf32ca830682638f1c (patch) | |
tree | e7fbee96d04f4e900be3b114370312dd4257d379 | |
parent | a65a210117f4f954e8010d1f627b77cf007995bb (diff) | |
download | nuttx-a1b0818673cff7d293ab28bf32ca830682638f1c.tar.gz nuttx-a1b0818673cff7d293ab28bf32ca830682638f1c.tar.bz2 nuttx-a1b0818673cff7d293ab28bf32ca830682638f1c.zip |
Update TODO list and README
-rw-r--r-- | nuttx/TODO | 82 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | nuttx/configs/sama5d4-ek/README.txt | 14 |
2 files changed, 53 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/nuttx/TODO b/nuttx/TODO index 3469b8e3c..1739b618a 100644 --- a/nuttx/TODO +++ b/nuttx/TODO @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -NuttX TODO List (Last updated August 18, 2014) +NuttX TODO List (Last updated September 13, 2014) ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This file summarizes known NuttX bugs, limitations, inconsistencies with @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ nuttx/ (2) Memory Managment (mm/) (3) Signals (sched/, arch/) (2) pthreads (sched/) - (11) Kernel Build + (9) Kernel/Protected Builds (4) C++ Support (6) Binary loaders (binfmt/) (13) Network (net/, drivers/net) @@ -326,26 +326,17 @@ o pthreads (sched/) solution. So I discarded a few hours of programming. Not a big loss from the experience I gained." -o Kernel Build - ^^^^^^^^^^^^ - - Title: GRAPHICS PARTITIONING. - Description: In the kernel build mode (where NuttX is built as a monolithic - kernel and user code must trap into the protected kernel via - syscalls), the single user mode cannot be supported. In this - built configuration, only the multiple user mode can be supported - with the NX server residing inside of the kernel space. - Status: Closed. This is not a bug, this is just way the things are. - Priority: N/A. +o Kernel/Protected Build + ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Title: NSH PARTITIONING. Description: There are issues with several NSH commands in the NuttX kernel - build mode (where NuttX is built as a monolithic kernel and - user code must trap into the protected kernel via syscalls). - The current NSH implementation has several commands that call - directly into kernel internel functions for whicht there is - no syscall available. The commands cause link failures in - the kernel build mode and must currently be disabled. + and protected build modes (where NuttX is built as a monolithic + kernel and user code must trap into the protected kernel via + syscalls). The current NSH implementation has several commands + that call directly into kernel internal functions for which + there is no syscall available. The commands cause link failures + in the kernel/protected build mode and must currently be disabled. Here are known problems that must be fixed: COMMAND KERNEL INTERFACE(s) @@ -374,9 +365,9 @@ o Kernel Build Title: TELNETD PARTITIONING. Description: Telnetd is implemented as a driver that resides in the apps/ - directory. In the kernel build, mode, the driver logic must - be moved into the kernel part of the build (nuttx/, although - the application level interfaces must stay in apps/). + directory. In the kernel/protected build modes, the driver + logic must be moved into the kernel part of the build (nuttx/, + although the application level interfaces must stay in apps/). Status: Open Priority: Medium @@ -389,16 +380,9 @@ o Kernel Build Status: Open Priority: Medium - Title: LOAD-ABLE MODULE SUPPORT UNVERIFIED - Description: It has not been verified if NXFLAT and ELF modules work correctly - in the kernel build. They should load into user-space memory. - Status: Open - Priority: Medium. There is no configuration that uses NXFLAT or ELF with - a kernel build now. - - Title: C++ CONSTRUCTORS HAVE TOO MANY PRIVILEGES + Title: C++ CONSTRUCTORS HAVE TOO MANY PRIVILEGES (PROTECTED MODE) Description: When a C++ ELF module is loaded, its C++ constructors are called - via sched/task_starthook.c logic. This logic runs in kernel mode. + via sched/task_starthook.c logic. This logic runs in protected mode. The is a security hole because the user code runs with kernel- privileges when the constructor executes. @@ -445,6 +429,12 @@ o Kernel Build "This one would be easy: Just a change to include/nuttx/userspace.h, configs/*/kernel/up_userspace.c, libc/, sched/sched_addreadytorun.c, and sched/sched_removereadytorun.c. That would eliminate 59% of the syscalls." + + Update: + This is probably also just a symptom of the OS test that does mostly + console output. The requests for the pid() are part of the + implementation of the I/O's re-entrant semaphore implementation and + would not be an issue in the more general case. Status: Open Priority: Low-Medium. Right now, I do not know if these syscalls are a real performance issue or not. The above statistics were collected @@ -452,18 +442,6 @@ o Kernel Build amount of console output. There is probably no issue with more typical embedded applications. - Title: ARMv6/7-M SYSCALL PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT - Description: Currently the code issues an SVCall to go from user- to kernel-mode - and another go return to user-mode. The second is unnecessary: - If there were a stub in user-space that just set the unprivileged - mode in the CONTROL register and returned, then the dispatch_syscall() - function could just jump to the stub instead of using second SVCall. - Hmmm... would this expose a security whole by executing in user-space - with privileges? That already happens when the userspace memory - allocators are called. - Status: Open - Priority: Low (unless performance becomes an issue). - Title: SECURITY ISSUES Description: In the current designed, the kernel code calls into the user-space allocators to allocate user-space memory. It is a security risk to @@ -493,6 +471,24 @@ o Kernel Build improvement. However, there is no strong motivation now do do that partitioning work. + Title: ARMVv7-A STACK ISSUE + Description: Currently a program running as a process in the kernel build mode + cannot run other programs that reside on the file system. Why? + Because in order to run those other programs, the new program's + address environment must be instantiated in memory to load the + .text and .data and to allocate the initial user space components + from the new user heap. + However, the previous program's stack currently resides in its + heap. So when a process tries to run another program, its heap + is unmapped and the system crashes. + The fix is to add a separate stack in a separate memory region + that does not get unmapped when creating new processes. There + are hooks in place to do this; I just need to get time to get + that done. + Status: Open + Priority: Pretty high... the kernel build is useless without this + capability. + o C++ Support ^^^^^^^^^^^ diff --git a/nuttx/configs/sama5d4-ek/README.txt b/nuttx/configs/sama5d4-ek/README.txt index 50198f922..d55935a2e 100644 --- a/nuttx/configs/sama5d4-ek/README.txt +++ b/nuttx/configs/sama5d4-ek/README.txt @@ -3930,6 +3930,20 @@ Configurations file system. A considerable amount of testing has been done and there are no known defects as of this writing. + 2014-9-13: Currently a program running as a process in the kernel build + mode cannot run other programs that reside on the file system. Why? + Because in order to run those other programs, the new program's + address environment must be instantiated in memory to load the .text + and .data and to allocate the initial user space components from the + new user heap. + + However, the previous program's stack currently resides in its heap. + So when a process tries to run another program, its heap is unmapped + and the system crashes. The fix is to add a separate stack in a + separate memory region that does not get unmapped when creating new + processes. There are hooks in place to do this; I just need to get + time to get that done. + nsh: This configuration directory provide the NuttShell (NSH). This is a |